Response to McGee and Gardiner: FURTHER THOUGHTS ABOUT THE "TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE" IN BRAIN DEATH DETERMINATION
McGee and Gardiner have published an interesting article about the differences in legal challenges to the concept of brain death (BD) in the USA, Canada and the UK [1]. During the last few decades, three main brain-oriented formulations of death have been discussed: whole brain, brainstem death and higher brain standards [2-5]. Bernat claimed that “the formulation of whole-brain death provides the most congruent map for our correct understanding of the concept of death” [6]. Bernat and his colleagues’ view about the defence of the whole-brain formulation of death was cited by the United States President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research as the conceptual basis of BD.[5,7,8,9]. The President's Commission recommended the adoption by all US states of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) [10,11].
Pallis articulated the brainstem death view which dismissed the use of EEG or cerebral blood flow studies as confirmatory tests in BD diagnosis [12,13]. According to McGee and Gardiner [1], the legal position in the UK is relatively well settled, because the historic Royal Colleges’ Code of Practice provides the accepted medical standard for declaring death in the UK [14]. The recognised standard for defining death is “the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness, combined with irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe and therefore irreversible cessation of the integrative function of the brainstem”.12-14].
The conceptual and practical difference in BD determination between the USA and UK has been known as the "transatlantic divide" [15].
A critical component of this controversy is when intracranial pathology is localised to the posterior fossa. Both intracranial blood flow and EEG may persist when a primary brainstem catastrophe, that does not produce markedly raised intracranial pressure, is present. [16-19]
Varela et al. recently analysed three cases out of 161 that met inclusion criteria (1.9% of all brain deaths during this period), further adding another patient from a different hospital [18]. All four patients suffered from catastrophic posterior fossa injuries, and therefore fulfilled the UK BD clinical criteria, including the apnoea test. Those 4 patients showed preservation of supratentorial blood flow, which disappeared after a period of between 2 and 6 days, then allowing a diagnosis of BD, according to the whole brain criteria adopted in USA. These authors concluded that patients with primary posterior fossa catastrophic lesions who clinically seemed to be brain-dead according to USA BD criteria would typically evolve from retaining, to losing, supratentorial blood flow. Therefore, the authors asserted that if CBF assessment is used as an ancillary test, providing an additional criterion for the declaration of BD, those patients are not different from those who become BD due to supratentorial lesions.
Nonetheless, the challenge of the aforementioned cases focuses on determining when the patients were brain-dead according to US or UK BD criteria. According to UK guidelines, patients were brain-dead after the first clinical evaluation and after 6 days all four patients were brain-dead according to US guidelines[20-23].
Therefore, in primary brainstem or cerebellar lesions, under the whole-brain formulation, several BD guidelines have stipulated that ancillary electrical and/or blood flow tests are needed to confirm BD diagnosis [3,20,24-28].
I agree with the Bernat et al. [5,8,9] that irreversible cessation of functions of the whole brain is BD, and means death of the individual, because the “brain is responsible for the functioning of the organism as a whole”.
McGee and Gardiner also emphasize the case of Jahi McMath as a reason for BD diagnosis controversies [1], but this is other story [20-22]. I was able to study Jahi McMath using ancillary tests, 9 months after her initial diagnosis, although I did not have access to her initial clinical history [20-23]. Preservation of intracranial structures, both in the brainstem and cerebral hemispheres was documented by MRI, nine months after a cardiac arrest, in spite of vast brain injury. Conceptually, a brain-dead patient has a complete absence of intracranial cerebral blood flow. Hence, this contradicts a BD diagnosis in Jahi.
True EEG activity was found in this case over 2 μV of amplitude. Moreover, the power spectra analysis showed predominant activity within the delta-theta range. The EEG may persist in posterior fossa catastrophes that do not produce raised intracranial pressure. Jahi presented with a huge lesion at the pons, extending to the medulla. All heart rate variability (HRV) bands were preserved in this patient (BD has been characterised by the loss of all HRV components). This is a demonstration of autonomic activity conservation in the medulla, within vagal and other autonomic central nuclei. Another significant finding was the autonomic reactivity, assessed by HRV, to “Mother Talks” stimulation, demonstrating remaining function at different levels of the central autonomic nervous system. These results might explain the video findings reported by Shewmon, who observed Jahi’s movements which he interpreted as responses to commands.
Jahi McMath was not in a coma because, although she showed a sleep-like state of unrousable, unresponsiveness without evidence of awareness of self or environment, and her clinical examination showed a complete absence of brain-stem reflexes and no spontaneous drive to breath (apnoea). This patient was not in either an unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) or in a minimally conscious state (MCS) state. The reason for this is that she had not shown intermittent wakefulness manifested by the presence of sleep-wake cycles or variably preserved cranial nerve function. Moreover, UWS patients can usually breathe on their own, without the need for mechanical ventilation. The possibility of being in a MCS and/or MCS-emergent state is excluded, because these patients show, upon clinical examination, recovery of cognitive functions [20-22]. When I examined her ancillary tests, she was not brain-dead. Therefore, I claimed that this is a new state of disorder of consciousness not previously classified [22].
C. Machado
Havana, Cuba
Email: braind@infomed.sid.cu
No external funding and no competing interests declared.
References
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